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Introduction: limits to certification 
Aquaculture, the farming of fish and other aquatic organisms, has developed into one of 
the fastest growing sources of animal protein, and is important for international trade and 
domestic consumption alike (Belton & Thilsted, 2014; Troell et al., 2014). In the context 
of food security, these farmed fish not only provide protein, but also make a fundamental 
contribution to securing a range of essential micronutrients (Thilsted et al., 2016). 
Although increasingly varied in scale and intensity, for many of the species grown in 
tropical developing countries, aquaculture is still dependent in large part on small-holders, 
characterized by limited investment in assets, low operational costs, a large dependence 
on family labor, and a diversified portfolio of livelihood activities beyond fish farming 
(Edwards, 2013). As in other farming sectors, these small-holders are made economically 
vulnerable by their lack of investment capacity to expand production. But in addition, the 
vulnerability of small-holder aquaculture farmers is compounded by the high risk of 
shared poor water quality and the devastating effects of disease on their output. 
Reducing the production risk across the industry is central to meeting wider ambitions of 
expanded global aquaculture production. One of the governance tools used to reduce risk 
is eco-certification, which sets voluntary auditable standards to improve ecological and 
social farming practices, and attach labels to products and enterprises that meet these 
standards (Hatanaka & Busch, 2008). It is assumed that certified products enable farmers 
to benefit from reduced production costs, as well as increased market access and higher 
market prices (Bronnmann & Asche, 2016; Wessells, 2002). The two most dominant 
aquaculture standards are the European-based Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) 
standards and the US-based Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA). While the number of 
certified farms has expanded at a phenomenal rate in recent years, this growth has been 
largely limited to larger-scale, vertically integrated firms (Jespersen et al., 2014; Trifković, 
2014). Small-holders, who predominantly access Europe and the US on the basis of short-
term price contracts rather than long-term relational contracts, have proven less able to 
comply with these standards because of language, a lack of resources and poor literacy 
(Bush et al., 2013a). 
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Although voluntary in principle, these standards have become commonly linked to export 
market access. Since 2010, retailers in the US and EU, two of the largest seafood import 
markets in the world by value (FAO, 2016), have pledged to only sell certified products in 
response to non-governmental organization (NGO) campaigns directed at the 
unsustainability of both capture fisheries and aquaculture (Sampson et al., 2015; Bush et 
al., 2013a). The timeline for these pledges has been gradually delayed from 2012 to 2018 
as the challenges of realizing 100% provision of certified fish has become apparent. The 
consequence is that for producers to maintain access to these markets, they have to 
comply with these eco-standards. In the short term, these changes directly affect their 
livelihoods and incomes through increased costs and efforts, while any benefits from 
sustainability remain a long-term and uncertain proposition. 
The question of who should be held responsible for sustainable production has been 
widely debated. But when it comes to the use of eco-standards, or any other legal or 
market requirement, the burden of demonstrating improvements towards sustainability is 
narrowly assigned to producers. Indeed, this assumption is the very basis of voluntary 
eco-certification; farmers should upgrade their production practices and farm 
infrastructure to demonstrate compliance with standards before being rewarded through 
the market (see Cashore, Auld & Newsom, 2004, for a discussion on this key 
assumption). However, assuming farmers can simply respond to eco-standards as 
demanded by retailers does not take into consideration the highly differentiated 
capabilities of producers to respond. This is particularly important for aquaculture, which 
is ostensibly a developing-world activity, with over 85%  of the volume of fish traded to 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries stemming from developing 
countries (FAO, 2014). Shifting the burden of proof to producers in these developing 
countries does not consider the capacity of individual producers to demonstrate 
compliance with international standards, as well as the impact these standards have on 
them. 
The assumption that producers have the capacity to respond to standards also overlooks 
key market dynamics, including how so-called ‘lead firms’ like retailers and food service 
companies coordinate global value chains and set contracts. Because of the strong levels 
of control that EU and US retailers and importers exercise in the seafood industry, they 
are more able to dictate the terms of trade to their suppliers. Not only do retailers 
demand sustainable seafood, they establish contracts in order to deliver high volumes 
with the lowest possible unit cost (Bjørndal et al., 2015; Fernández-Polanco & Llorente, 
2015). It remains unclear whether any market premiums are observed for those products 
certified, and there is even less clarity as to whether these premiums are passed up the 
chain to producers (Ha et al., 2012; Marschke & Wilkings, 2014; Blomquist, Bartolino & 
Waldo, 2015). What instead appears to be happening is that the cost of certification is 
pushed back up the chain to producers, placing a disproportionate burden on small-
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holders who are less able to absorb these costs. In classical Marxist terms, this can 
undermine the value of production and therefore the viability of the producers upon 
whom these retailers rely for their supply of seafood. If certification is going to make a 
meaningful contribution to sustainability, it appears new models are necessary – models 
that change the ways in which buyers like retailers can promote more inclusive and 
effective modes of improvement. 
 
 
 
Understanding value chain governance 
To further explore the potential of alternative modes of eco-certification in the 
aquaculture sector, we now turn to global value chain (GVC) governance. In general 
terms, GVC governance refers to how firms cooperate to coordinate and impose product 
specifications or ‘qualities’ on the production and trade of a product through to the point 
of consumption (Bair, 2009; Gereffi, 2014). As variously argued (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; 
Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011; Bush et al., 2015), such analysis exposes how firms and 
their suppliers take into consideration new norms, values and practices, including those 
related to sustainability. In doing so, GVC analysis enables us to then understand how 
lead firms seek greater stability and higher quality of the products they buy by setting clear 
product specifications over suppliers. 
One way these retailers set product specifications for their suppliers is through voluntary 
eco-standards, which in the case of aquaculture are designed to translate new norms 
around sustainability. These standards are an example of what Gibbon, Bair and Ponte 
(2008) call ‘governance as normalization,’ or the ‘re-alignment’ of practice throughout a 
chain to mirror or materialize an introduced standard, code or norm. In the agri-food 
sector, which includes aquaculture, these standards primarily target the farm and 
processor level, with the assumption that standard compliance at this level enables firms 
to generate assurance and credibility on the open global market (Hatanaka, Bain & Busch, 
2005). In turn, those complying with these standards are expected to benefit from 
balancing the risk and rewards of improved production practices, market access and even 
higher market prices. 
Whether a lead firm chooses to employ voluntary eco-standards or not depends in large 
part on the level of control they (wish to) have over their suppliers. To understand this 
control or ‘power’ of some firms over others, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) 
developed the notion of governance as coordination, which explains the ways in which 
control is leveraged by the transmission of product specification (such as eco-standards) 
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along the chain given the capacity of suppliers to meet these specifications. They identify 
a spectrum of five value-chain configurations, which move from low levels of so-called 
‘market’ coordination, to high levels of so-called ‘captive’ coordination, and end in 
complete control over production through vertical integration (Gereffi, Humphrey & 
Sturgeon, 2005). Moving along this spectrum, the degree of control and power over 
suppliers increases. 
Governance as ‘normalization’, or setting and transferring norms to others in the value 
chain, can influence coordination in a number of ways. If more complex information can 
be incorporated in voluntary eco-standards, then retailers and food service companies 
may be able to maintain control over suppliers at a distance without having to directly 
invest in internal surveillance and control (Ponte, 2009). However, for sustainability 
standards, this creates a potential paradox. The sustainability norms embodied in these 
standards will force suppliers to develop new capabilities to improve the performance of 
production (Nadvi, 2014; Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005). But the high level of 
capabilities required will mean that retailers who aim to sell only certified products will 
likely exclude a large proportion of their suppliers from the market. In doing so, retailers 
may limit their own supply of product and limit any gains in sustainable production. 
Faced with this paradox, it appears a more inclusive certification model is needed. 
 
Rewarding ‘developmental’ chain coordination 
Developing a more inclusive improvement agenda for aquaculture certification requires a 
‘double shift’. First is a shift away from certification’s focus on the farm scale and farmers 
as a target of regulation, to instead focus on the actors who play an active role in setting 
and demanding normative claims like sustainability. Second is a shift away from the lead 
firm as coordinator to the lead firm as partner for improvement. If both of these shifts can 
be realized, then more inclusive forms of sustainability improvements may be possible 
through eco-certification. 
Moving beyond environmental or social standards at the farm level would then move to 
assessing the performance of buyers in supporting farmers to improve their production 
practices. This is a clear break from current observations that retailers use standards to 
outsource the cost and risk for dealing with complex normative issues like sustainability 
by pushing compliance and assessment back up value chains to their suppliers (Riisgaard 
et al., 2010). Making retailers the target of standards and certification would instead 
require them to internalize production risk, because their performance would be the 
subject of assessment. More specifically, they would be assessed on their support to 
suppliers to demonstrate improvements in production, whether that be a set of normative 
voluntary standards or basic legal compliance. In turn, these retailers would be rewarded 
by a certificate and/or eco-label for ‘inclusive sustainability’. 
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While such an approach would be a radical shift in how certification is applied in the 
aquaculture and wider seafood industry, the idea is not altogether new. In their study of 
Ikea, the lifestyle and furnishings multi-national corporation based in Sweden, Ivarsson 
and Alvstam (2010) observe what they refer to as the ‘developmental’ mode of chain 
coordination. They distinguish this form of coordination from other forms, such as arms-
length market relations with suppliers or ‘capturing’ suppliers through long-term binding 
contracts. They argue that the buying relationship Ikea has with their suppliers is 
developmental for two reasons. First, it is based on the provision of technological and 
organizational assistance, co-innovation, human capacity building, and financial and 
administrative advice, all aimed at helping suppliers meet their stringent product 
specifications. Second, Ikea does not capture these suppliers through exclusivity clauses in 
their contracts, but instead allows them to use the support they receive to expand their 
client base. The philosophy is that an open form of support increases the pre-competitive 
quality of their sector overall. What this means is that buyers work with producers, seeing 
them as a fundamental part of their business rather than simply suppliers of products. 
Retailers are already partially engaging in developmental modes of coordination over 
currently ‘un-certifiable’ fish farmers through ‘aquaculture improvement projects’ (AIPs). 
Either coordinated directly by retailers or with the support of NGOs or consultants, AIPs 
support producers to move towards certification by, for example, directly financing 
improved farm practices, providing support for training on stocking, and pharmaceutical 
use, or paying for consultants to assist with the paperwork required to demonstrate 
improvement (SFP, 2016). In coordination terms, there are two general categories of 
these improvement projects (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016). First, top-down projects 
promote improvement by linking market access and higher prices with standard 
compliance. Second, bottom-up projects develop a wide range of farmer and government 
capabilities with the hope that buyers will recognize and reward any improvements with 
market access. In both cases, it is hoped that these improvements will ultimately be 
supported with secure market access as buyers meet their demand for sustainable 
aquaculture production. 
But unlike farm-level certification, which provides market recognition through an eco-
labelled product, retailers engaging in these developmental-like forms of coordination 
receive very little recognition for the support they provide. This is because current 
certification schemes are based on the binary logic of compliance/non-compliance, which 
is in turn based on a static moment of auditing and certification. They do not, by design, 
take into consideration the capabilities of the producers being assessed, or the level of 
support that is given by other chain actors such as retailers. In other words, they are 
limited in making sustainability claims around their support because there remains 
contested interpretations of what makes a credible and effective aquaculture improvement 
project (Sampson et al., 2015). Retailers therefore run the risk of not being able to make 
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claims in the market around the support they are providing because there is no 
independent third party substantiating their supposed support. It is exactly here that 
retail-level certification would fill this gap by providing a system of verification, market 
recognition, and ultimately greater incentives for further investment in small-holder 
support. 
The impact of retail-level certification may also foster the kind of inclusive sustainability 
improvement that is currently lacking in the industry in two distinct ways. First, voluntary 
certification is most commonly taken up by producers who already exhibit a degree of 
compliance, or are willing and capable of applying (Tlusty, 2012). By inadvertently cherry-
picking better performers, the degree of overall improvement across the industry remains 
limited. Recognizing and promoting continuous improvement towards sustainability 
would increase the involvement of less well-performing producers who cannot currently 
comply with high-level ASC or GAA standards. Such an inclusive approach is of key 
importance, because it is with these aquaculture producers that the greatest overall 
sustainability gains are still to be made. Making retailers responsible for demonstrating a 
developmental mode of sustainability support could also lead to considerable gains 
because the cost (and therefore the choice) to improve is no longer dispersed across 
literally millions of producers. 
Second, shifting the cost of certification down the value chain would also put pressure on 
retailers and suppliers to search for innovative and more efficient forms of organizing 
aquaculture sustainability. One outcome would be the need for greater efficiencies for 
retailers to deliver support to individual producers beyond the farm through, for example, 
cooperative forms of management. Cooperative management of aquaculture has been met 
with mixed success, largely because of poor internal capacity, weak state support, and the 
complexity of environmental and health issues such as water quality and disease (Ha, 
Bush & van Dijk, 2013). A developmental approach with buyer investment may prove 
more successful than current cooperative approaches because it would link the level and 
quality of producer support to the reputation and market demand of buyers. Because 
buyers would still be driven by environmental outcomes, the cooperatives they support 
may also engage in ecosystem or area-based forms of management (Macfadyen et al., 
2016), and in doing so, link farm-level practices to issues like water quality that extend 
well beyond the boundaries of a single farm (Soto, Aguilar-Manjarrez & Hishamunda, 
2008). 
The ‘developmental’ coordination of suppliers could also lead to improved risk 
management in the industry. By moving certification beyond the farm level and creating 
incentives for support from buyers in export markets, opportunities for insurance and 
new forms of financing may also emerge. Such opportunities would be transformative in 
the seafood sector in developing countries, given the high degree of production risk 
experienced by producers and the associated lack of formal insurance and finance 
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opportunities (WorldFish, 2011). The outcome would be two-fold: producers would 
benefit from receiving the necessary capacity to reduce production risk and sustainably 
intensify production, while buyers would benefit from a more stable supply of sustainably 
produced fish. 
 
New or existing certification schemes? 
Would such a system need new certification schemes beyond the ASC and GAA? Not 
necessarily. The goal of these certification schemes is to assure buyers that the products 
they are purchasing have been responsibly produced. While this goal would remain the 
same, a new standard would be required that focuses on verifying the developmental 
credentials of buyers. To this end, both ASC and GAA could incorporate a new 
‘developmental’ or ‘inclusive improvement’ standard to their certification. GAA already 
offers a reporting-based Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) standard that is modular to the 
extent that different ‘sub-standards’ are applied across four processes in the chain – 
processing plants, farms, feed mills and hatcheries – with the certification of each process 
(in the order presented here) rewarded with an additional star rating (GAA, n.d.). Moving 
to a retail-level certification may result in the addition of a standard ‘star’. ASC, on the 
other hand, is a metric-based farm-level standard. For them, it may be that a new 
standard, auditing approach and label would be required. If neither ASC nor GAA would 
be interested in adapting the scope of their existing certification, a standard or 
accreditation could be developed. 
The scope of a developmental standard could reflect the need to support the capabilities 
of producers or communities of producers to continually improve their production rather 
than setting a single and ‘fictitious’ level or goal of sustainability (Micheli et al., 2014; 
Tlusty & Thorsen, 2016). In practical terms, such a standard could follow Ivarsson and 
Alvstam (2010) and focus on new process-oriented categories, such as the provision of 
technological and organizational assistance, co-innovation, human capacity building, 
and/or financial and administrative advice. Alternatively, the standard could focus on 
supporting the broader capabilities of producer communities by investing in social and 
human capital. Doing so, they argue, would require assessing support for education, 
socioeconomic development, fair conditions of employment and diversification of 
livelihoods in cases of overexploitation. Bringing in these wider categories for an industry 
like aquaculture may appear to be moving beyond the scope responsibility of any buyer, 
but it is not without precedent. As notions of ‘extended responsibility’ of the retail sector 
grows (Bush et al., 2015), especially in the context of sourcing from developing countries, 
such activities may become the norm, especially if EU and US firms see such activities as 
a means to an end: that of securing a ‘sustainable’ product. 
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Finally, the emergence of a developmental standard would not make farm-level standards 
irrelevant. Aquaculture sub-sectors that are able to absorb and cope with the requirements 
of certification could still opt for one of the existing global standards. But for producers 
unable to cope, engaging with retailers that offer developmental support could be a means 
to create long-term market relations and/or develop their capabilities to engage directly 
with the existing global standards. By providing alternatives, such producers will, at the 
very least, have more and different incentives for improvement than is currently the case. 
 
Concluding remarks 
A retail-led ‘developmental’ model for aquaculture sustainability would inevitably create 
new kinds of dependencies between buyers and producers. And there is no guarantee that 
buyer certification will improve conditions for developing-world producers to be 
incorporated into global seafood value chains. But by giving market recognition for 
‘developmental’ modes of chain coordination, we can ensure that the responsibility for 
sustainable aquaculture is not placed on those with the least capacity for independent 
improvement. Instead of retailers undermining the capacity of farmers to respond to 
sustainability demands, responsibility will be placed at the feet of retailers (and other 
buyers) who do not replace the end consumer but do orchestrate global demand for fish 
products. Such an approach would also reinvigorate market-based approaches to 
sustainability governance. If retailers and other buyers are being recognized for the 
support they provide rather than the individual products on their shelves, then the race to 
be the greenest grocer on the high street may yet still drive substantial sustainability 
improvements in aquaculture and other sectors. 
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Critical questions 
1. Why would (or wouldn’t) a retailer agree to be certified against a developmental 
standard? 
Recipe: Canh chua cá tra (sweet and sour pangasius fish soup) 
Ingredients 
7 cups water 
3 tablespoons tamarind paste 
2 tablespoons (preferably palm) sugar 
2 large tomatoes, sliced and diced 
1 celery stick, chopped into bite-size pieces 
1 tablespoon (Vietnamese) fish sauce (Nước mắm) 
300 g Vietnamese pangasius (cá tra, a kind of catfish) cutlets (not fillets!), which 
you’ll have to search for at a Vietnamese or Asian specialty supermarket 
100 g Asian bean sprouts 
1 teaspoon finely chopped red chilli, sweet basil and fresh coriander 
Preparation 
Put the tamarind paste in cold water to dilute and strain. 
Throw the tamarind paste into a pot with the water and add the sugar, tomatoes, 
celery and fish sauce. Let simmer for about 15 minutes. 
Add the pangasius cutlets, bean sprouts and chillies, and simmer for a further 3 
minutes. 
Serve in individual soup bowls and garnish with plenty of mint, sweet basil or 
coriander. 
Serve with a side dish of Vietnamese fish sauce. 
(Adapted from www.food.com) 
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2. Does a developmental standard overcome the constraints that developing-world or 
small-holder producers face when selling to export markets? 
3. What might the impact of a development standard be for local and global food 
security? 
4. Are market-based governance approaches, like voluntary eco-certification, the only 
way to promote inclusive modes of sustainability improvement? Can you think of 
others? 
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